Visibility and politics: an Arendtian reading of the US drone policy by da Mota, S. et al.
Canterbury Christ Church University’s repository of research outputs
http://create.canterbury.ac.uk
Please cite this publication as follows: 
da Mota, S. and Barrinha, A. (2017) Visibility and politics: an Arendtian reading of 
the US drone policy. Nação e Defesa (146). pp. 49-65. ISSN 0870-757X. 
Link to official URL (if available):
http://www.idn.gov.pt/publicacoes/nacaodefesa/resumo_abstract/NeDef146_Abstra
ct_SarahMota_AndreBarrinha.pdf
This version is made available in accordance with publishers’ policies. All material 
made available by CReaTE is protected by intellectual property law, including 
copyright law. Any use made of the contents should comply with the relevant law.
Contact: create.library@canterbury.ac.uk
 1 
Visibility and politics:  
An Arendtian reading of the US drone policy   
 
By Sarah da Mota and André Barrinha 
 
 
Introduction  
 
Technology is radically changing security practices across the world and nothing exemplifies 
it better than the intensive use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) by the United States (US) in 
multiple theatres of operations across the world. As President Oďaŵa͛s ͞ǁeapoŶ of ĐhoiĐe͟, these so-
called drones have been used for different purposes such as surveillance and tracking, but also as a 
killing weapon in counter-terrorist and counterinsurgency contexts. In a three-page internal 
assessment released for the first time by the Obama administration on July 2016, the drone 
programme was defined as  
[a] combination of both independent and overlapping efforts overseen by the military and 
the CIA — with support from other intelligence community agencies such as the NSA 
[National Security Agency] — that vary in intensity and management depending on the 
country (Devereaux, 2016).  
 
Effectively, the US Armed Forces and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) have been using lethal 
drone strikes since 2001 to disrupt and eliminate organisations labelled as terrorist such as Al-Qaeda 
and, more recently, the Islamic State (IS). This implies that drone strikes have occurred in countries 
other than those in which the US had a direct military engagement, as long as the presence of Al-
Qaeda (or IS) affiliates can be verified, including countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia 
and Yemen
 
(Barrinha and da Mota, 2016). 
This drone programme, whose intensity and management is so loosely defined by the US 
government, has been severely criticised and documented by legal scholars and NGO͛s, particularly in 
relation to non-combat contexts such as Pakistan or Yemen (HRC, 2010; O͛CoŶŶell, 2010; Reprieve, 
2014; Stanford and NYU, 2012; The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 2015). By extension, the use 
of drones by the CIA has been censured as well, as the overall secrecy of these operations raises 
important questions of accountability and legitimacy.  
The wider mental configuration of the drone policy seems to occur within what Wiebe Bijker 
(2006) has identified as the dominant paradigm, among politicians and practitioners, of technological 
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determinism, which favours a standard image of technology as being positive, comforting and that 
mostly contributes to solving problems:  
[t]echnology is viewed as a sufficient end in itself and [...] the values of efficiency, power, 
and rationality are independent of context. The standard view accepts that technology can 
be employed negatively, but in this view the users are to be blamed, not the technology 
(Bijker, 2006: 683).  
 
The perspective that users are to be blamed may be found in much of the literature on the ethics of 
unmanned military technology (Strawser, 2013); accordingly, intelligence failure or poor decision-
making are responsible for operational mistakes (Shane, 2015).  
This article aims to discuss the ultimate political consequence of a deterministic mode of 
thinking, according to which technology ͞[Đ]aŶŶot be subject to ͚outside͛ control in the form of policy-
making or political deďate͟ (Bijker, 2006: 683). This article draws on Hannah Arendt͛s core postulates 
on politics, modern security, and society to problematise the political implications of using drones as 
a prominent security instrument in contemporary (and future) life. The starting point of this reflection 
is that drones are an instrument of double-invisibility: they are invisible to those that live in the areas 
where they are employed and invisible to those under whose name they are being used. As it will be 
seen, such invisibility has important consequences in terms of how political life unfolds and, 
ultimately, on how security as a political practice is decided and executed.  
In terms of structure, the article will first unpack the idea of ͞ ǀisiďilitǇ͟ as central to the study 
of drones and their impact upon politics, power and security. Visibility, we argue, is crucial to 
understand the fundamental distinction that Arendt offers in her work between the private and the 
public sphere, which ultimately also sheds light on the complex dynamics of political secrecy and 
legitimacy underlying the use of drones. The article will then analyse how drones materialise in their 
invisibility and discuss what that means politically. The third part will focus on the US drone policy 
during the Barack Obama tenure in the White House and the recent positions he adopted before 
leaving office. Here, it will be shown that his discourse on making the drone policy more accountable 
seems to express the idea of partial repent, in an attempt to give the issue more visibility on the public 
realm.  
 
I. Arendt and the political condition of visibility  
Hannah AreŶdt͛s work became popular (and controversial) during the ϭ96Ϭ͛s with the 
publication of Eichmann in Jerusalem: a report on the banality of Evil in 1963. She was by then a well-
established political thinker, having published Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) and The Human 
Condition (1958), among other important works. AreŶdt͛s work has been progressively applied to 
International Relations in the last decade (Berkowitz et al., 2010; Buckler, 2011; Frazer and Hutchings, 
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2008; Lang and Williams, 2005; Owens, 2007), in particular by authors concerned with the conceptual 
and philosophical connections between war, politics, and ethics. Although Arendt is not commonly 
associated with the study of security – much less with the specific issue of drones about which so 
much has been written in the last few years – her work offers important insights on the role and the 
dangers of technology in society. As we are moving more firmly towards the technologically-enabled 
fuzziness between internal and external security (Lutterbeck, 2005), Arendt, as the philosopher of 
plurality and political freedom, certainly assumes an increasingly prominent role in assessing the 
impact that technology has in the definition and implementation of security policies.  
In Human Condition, Arendt establishes a connection between technology and politics, when 
she considers that the direction of scientific and technological progress, with its subsequent 
consequences for the future of human nature on Earth, result from a political choice (1998 [1958]: 4). 
Politics, in her view, should dictate the normative fate of technology, drawing on the utilitarian 
assumption that ͞[e]ǀerǇ tool and implement is primarily designed to make human life easier and 
human labor less paiŶful͟ (ibid.: 151). Politics is defined as the ultimate public arena where the 
possibility of freedom lays collectively, and where all must be heard or seen (ibid.: 50). In the public 
realm of politics, individual freedom cannot be thought outside of a collective polity, as politics 
becomes the public arena of struggle and freedom for collective actors. This has to do with AreŶdt͛s 
conception of politics as action, whereby action is described as the only activity directly driven by men 
without the intermediation of things, meaning to take an initiative, to undertake, in order to make 
something work, move or change (ibid.: 177).  
Accordingly, Arendt suggests, if man is a social animal, action presupposes society, and 
politics cannot be practiced in loneliness. The true basis of politics is the freedom of coming together 
and discussing issues of public interest. AreŶdt͛s concern was with this possibility of sharing plurality, 
more than with the result, or the form of the discussion.1 This understanding of politics is placed 
against that of tyranny, in which there is no political conflict and no political consensus, but simply the 
elimination of the possibility of both. Following Montesquieu, Arendt argued that it is the principle of 
fear that is at the core of tyrannies: ͞[t]he tyrant acts because he fears his subjects and the oppressed 
because they fear the tǇraŶt͟ (2007: 724).  
Political deliberation on the use of technology, or any other matter within a polity, should 
obey the same principle of public, collective debate, and be subject to struggle and discussion. But in 
the particular case of technology, AreŶdt͛s view suggests that the discussion is  
                                                 
1 Her work has been criticised for its lack of consideration for strategic action. For Amy Allen, ͞AreŶdt͛s attempt 
to exclude strategic action from the domain of the political altogether paints too rosy a picture of our political 
life͟ (2002: 143). 
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[n]ot so much whether we are the masters or the slaves of our machines, but whether 
machines still serve the world and its things, or if, on the contrary, they and the automatic 
motion of their processes have begun to rule and even destroy world and things (1998 
[1958]: 151).  
The object of politics should not be human mastery over technology, but its actual practical, normative 
effect upon human life. Arendt is concerned with the possibility that the automation of destruction 
depoliticises technology, thus overruling the collective, political debate and human capacity for 
decision. In this sense, ͞ǀisiďilitǇ͟ unfolds as the ultimate political condition for technology to remain 
within the public realm and within the possibility for human freedom. It is noteworthy how AreŶdt͛s 
predicaments on the political challenges posed by technology were an early elaboration of what 
contemporary technology studies have come to develop. For instance, Wiebe Bijker (2006: 689) 
discusses the notions of politics and democracy as used in technology studies, and highlights the 
centrality of knowledge, transparency, and accountability within the political system of modern 
democracy. Technology is now seen as ͞[p]roduĐiŶg and upholding a modern democratic concept of 
visible power whose exercise appears publicly accountable to the large puďliĐ͟ (ibid.: 690; emphasis 
added). 
Related to the concept of visibility is that of violence. For Arendt, violence as an instrument 
of coercion can destroy power, but power can never grow out of it: ͞[p]oǁer and violence are 
opposites; where the one rules absolutely, the other is aďseŶt͟ (1969: 56). Actually, the particular use 
of violence to promote fear signifies the absence of power (Arendt, 1969). The use of violence tends 
to be opposite to politics, as it usually leads to the silencing of plurality. Contrary to power, violence 
can only be politically used if justified, for it must be a means to a given (political) end – war or violence 
in general cannot be justified in any other terms, such as morality.2 Violence is only justified if used 
briefly and in order to establish new political spaces (Beardsworth, 2008: 507). In On Violence (1969), 
Hannah Arendt defines two contexts in which violence is justified – as a response to extreme injustice, 
and as an opener for political space. The use of non-violence requires, as a pre-requisite, that there 
already is some space for politics. As she suggests, GaŶdhi͛s campaign would not have succeeded in 
anti-political places such as Nazi Germany or “taliŶ͛s Soviet Union (Frazer and Hutchings, 2008: 102). 
In that sense, violence is never political, but it can open the space for its creation. As explained by 
Elizabeth Frazer and Kimberley Hutchings (ibid.: 104),  
 
Arendt certainly wants to say that [violence] is not political, strictly grammatically 
speaking. But there seems to be no particular reason, on just this account, why 
political actors should reject non-political (strictly speaking) actions if they bring 
about desired political effects. Such as the one that she has in view – making the 
                                                 
2 Regarding morality in politics, Arendt follows the Schmittian critique, by refusing to acknowledge its role. As 
Patricia Owens concludes: ͞[ď]oth Schmitt and Arendt shared a belief that morality in political and international 
affairs could only lead to disillusionment and the further intensification and brutalization of ǁar͟ (2007: 508). 
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public world in which political action is possible. Of course, for the most part Arendt 
argues that violence is politically ineffective. However, the concession that violence 
might be the only way significantly weakens this strand of her argument. 
 
Although visibility appears as a fundamental condition for politics and plurality, Arendt accepts as an 
exception to the public realm, that the public going private is beneficial for things that need to be 
hidden from publicity. Private property is ͞[t]he only reliable hiding place from the common public 
world, not only from everything that goes on in it but also from its very publicity, from being seen and 
being heard͟ (Arendt, 1998 [1958]: 71). Within the protective security of four walls, humans meet a 
location, a space that is reserved for concealment.   
 In Arendt's view, visibility is an essential criterion for the practice of politics, but invisibility 
is no less important as a space for reclusion, where one can get on with the aspects of life that are not 
politically relevant, or what Arendt calls ͞life processes͟. As mentioned by Patricia Owens, 
[t]he dominance of security does not reside in empowering the sovereign to decide the law 
and exceptions to the law […].
 
The dominant discourses and practices of security are 
exemplary instances of the modern rise of the social, as understood by Hannah Arendt. The 
social is the realm where the ͚life proĐess͛ has achieved its own public domain; the 
discourse of security has provided the central justification and mechanism for the 
expansion of the ͚life͛ of society under capitalism and the related modern belief that life is 
the highest political good (2011: 16). 
 
Arendt sees this rise of the social as ͞the modern discovery of iŶtiŵaĐǇ͟ (1998 [1958]: 69), in which 
the private realm dissolved. This represents an intrusion into the public space, because the fixation of 
the social with the life process of mankind sacrifices action – as the work in concert of a collective 
(Gordon, 2001: 100). As a consequence, both public and private spheres are ruined: ͞[t]he public 
because it has become a function of the private and the private because it has become the only 
common concern left͟ (Arendt, 1998 [1958]: 69). To Patricia Owens (2016), this phenomenon equals 
to ͞household goǀerŶaŶĐe͟, a form of governance based on the ͞ŵiŶistratioŶ of life proĐesses͟ in 
which populations are essentially domesticated and depoliticised – an understanding that is not far 
from Michel FouĐault͛s biopolitics (2000). In all, the rise of the social makes discourses and practices 
of security more visible, but only to the extent that they exacerbate life͛s necessities of security, 
thereby overcoming the private realm, and minimising the security of concealment for the sake of 
social control. In other words, although security is provided by, and through, high visibility, it remains 
fundamentally depoliticised and disregards the freedom of populations. 
 As the next sections will show, it can be argued that the use of drones produces an inversion 
of this visibility-invisibility relation: the politics of security and its execution become invisible to the 
public eye, whereas the notion of a secure private environment disappears from the areas in which 
drones are operating. In that regard, drones invert the relation between visibility and politics: they 
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hide what is political and highlight what is supposed to be private.  
 
II. Drones and low visibility: the security of American life over politics? 
This section highlights how the low visibility of drone policies results from a ͞disasseŵďled͟3 
(Abrahamsen and Williams, 2009) relationship between control and outsourcing that has been 
managed by the Obama administration in terms of covertness and political secrecy. Within that 
ambiguous equation, political visibility has become secondary to the provision of security in the name 
of North American citizens, and has affected both the public realm of other countries, and the very 
possibility of freedom for the citizens in foreign territories where drones are used as lethal weapons. 
In this sense, depoliticisation occurs due to an accentuation of the US private realm as the realm of 
freedom, and to the preoccupation with the life process (Gordon, 2001: 105-106) within the security 
of the U“͛ four walls.  
Secrecy and deception have been recurrently used throughout history as a ͞ŵeaŶs to 
achieve political eŶds͟, and can therefore be seen as ͞justifiaďle tools͟ (Arendt, 1972: 4). However, 
Arendt raises the question of to whom is concealment destined. Is it ever aimed at the enemy, or is it 
destined to domestic consumption? (ibid.: 14) Are there any tactical considerations for secrecy,4 
concealment, or lying? As Katharine Kindervater shows (2016), the covert use of military technology 
is not uncommon in the evolution of Western warfare, often combined with different techniques of 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. In this context, the role and involvement of the CIA in 
the US drone programme is nothing particularly new or surprising. Although it has never been clearly 
acknowledged or held accountable, ͞The highly classified CIA program to kill militants in the tribal 
regions of Pakistan [...] is the ǁorld͛s worst-kept secret͟ (Bergen and Tiedemann, 2010). The insistence 
on maintaining CIA͛s actions non visible has effectively been endorsed by Barack Obama, who has 
referred to legal arguments such as the ͞state secrets priǀilege͟ to deflect inquiries into the 
goǀerŶŵeŶt͛s use of lethal force in foreign countries from the beginning of his presidency, and has 
never forced the Agency to publicly answer for the deaths of non-Western civilians during the eight-
year covert bombing campaign (Devereaux and Emmons, 2016). As Simon Chesterman explains:  
Intelligence services have a chequered history of abuse, but their legitimate 
activities tend to be justified in established democracies by reference to their 
                                                 
3 Rita Abrahamsen and Michael C. Williams (2009) draw on Saskia “asseŶ͛s notion of state ͞disasseŵďlǇ͟, 
according to which national states disassemble and develop new global assemblages incorporating privatisation 
and globalisation, to approach the growth of private security within broader shifts of global governance. They 
show how the public-private and global/local distinctions and relationships have been re-articulated into what 
they term ͞gloďal security asseŵďlages͟. 
4 In the US, secrecy is no novelty. In 1969, for instance, President Nixon and Henry Kissinger decided to bomb 
Cambodia without any notice to Congress or the public, and the raids were conducted in deepest secrecy 
(Cockburn, 2015: 429). 
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grounding in the rule of law – a relatively recent requirement in some countries
 
– 
and the existence of an accountability chain to democratic institutions (Chesterman, 
2008: 1069). 
 
Not only is this political secrecy a real challenge to visibility and accountability, as it is reinforced by 
the ͞sĐieŶtifiĐ development and knowledge production and practices of killing and ĐoŶtrol͟ 
(Kindervater, 2016: 234). Security increasingly depends on a form of specialised and technical 
knowledge that can only be provided by a restricted epistemic community of experts, such as in the 
fields of information systems, engineering, robotics, and cybernetics. Many notions and procedures 
from those fields are unknown to most of the policymakers and require very specific skills and 
information. Such form of knowledge is so technical that it is not meant to be public, in the sense that 
it is not understood or mastered by a vast majority of individuals.   
Therefore, developing technologies such as drones, and applying them in contexts of 
warfare, counter-terrorism or counterinsurgency, can ultimately be considered as a sophisticated 
form of contemporary social and political control that is ͞[ŵ]uĐh better symbolized by manipulation 
than coercion, by remote and invisible limits than by guns or haŶdĐuffs͟, implying ͞[ď]eiŶg more 
covert, embedded and remote, and often without the awareness or consent of its subject (Bijker, 
2006: 687). For the Obama administration, this lack of publicity began in the very decision-making 
process designed for drone strikes. Every week during his presidency, Obama held a meeting in the 
White House Situation Room with two dozen of security officials, during which he was given a list, or 
PowerPoint of suspected terrorists, and approved each individual name to become a target to kill, 
based on the suspeĐts͛ personal biographies (Becker and Shane, 2012). According to the ͞Drone 
Papers͟ – a series of secret military documents disclosed by The Intercept in 2015 – there was a kill 
list with selected individual targets for assassination, according to which the President only approved 
the targets, and not each individual strike. As for the CIA, it is reported that it has created its own list 
and rules for strikes, meaning that there are additional strikes and deaths to those authorised by the 
kill list that occur in the shadow (Currier, 2015). 
Politically, the apology of the use of drones is made in reference to their effectiveness, and 
sustained by a discourse of rationality in risk avoidance:  
Our actions are effective. Dozens of highly skilled core al Qaeda commanders, trainers, 
bomb makers, and operatives have been taken off the battlefield. Plots have been 
disrupted that would have targeted international aviation, US transit systems, European 
cities and our troops in Afghanistan. These strikes have saved lives (The White House, 
2013). 
 
This kind of security decisions are part of ͞refleǆiǀe politiĐs͟ (Rasmussen, 2001), as a politics in which 
meaning is constantly constructed in a rationalisation of risks, in order to manage them despite their 
latent inexistence. This move promotes preemptive action according to ͞pre-active politiĐs͟ (Beck, 
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2009: 41), which privileges prevention, expert knowledge and technical solutions over problem-
solving properly said (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2007: 135). As threats such as terrorism are hardly 
controllable or eliminated, governments prefer to act by anticipation than run higher risks by not 
intervening (Coker, 2002: 62).  
The targeting and subsequent killing of Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen in 2011, an American 
citizen, has been one of the most controversial cases to date, giving rise to much questioning and 
partial attempts at public justification by the Obama administration. Andrew Cockburn exposes the 
case as follows:  
Anwar al-Awlaki, for example, billed for a time as ͞the most dangerous man in the ǁorld,͟ 
was publicly nominated to the CIA͛s kill list in April 2011. Awlaki had already retreated to 
the heartland of his tribe, the Awalik. It was easy to believe that the fugitive was hidden in 
the desert fastness, but in fact, as Guardian reporter Ghaith Abdul-Ahad discovered when 
he visited the triďe͛s ruling Sultan, although everyone in the neighborhood knew where the 
notorious preacher was living, no one seemed interested in arresting him. ͞The 
government haǀeŶ͛t asked us to hand him iŶ,͟ Sultan Fareed bin Babaker told the reporter. 
͞If they do then we will think about it. But no one has asked us.͟  
A few weeks before this conversation took place, a pair of Justice Department lawyers in 
Washington had obligingly provided the Obama administration with a secret legal 
justification for summarily executing Awlaki, accepting as a premise that he posed an 
͞iŵŵiŶeŶt͟ threat and that his capture was ͞iŶfeasiďle͟ (Cockburn, 2015: 3907).   
 
The fact is that, further to a lawsuit filed by the New York Times and two of its reporters, the US federal 
court has refused to require the Department of Justice to disclose a legal justification for the targeted 
killing of Awlaki (Liptak, 2013). The motivation behind this lawsuit was to question US government 
and to know its legal position on the use of targeted killings against persons having ties to terrorism. 
To the lawyer of the New York Times, Jameel Jaffer, this ruling ͞[d]eŶies the public access to crucial 
information about the goǀerŶŵeŶt͛s extrajudicial killing of US citizens and also effectively greenlights 
its practice of making selective and self-serving disĐlosures͟ (ibid.). Ultimately, this is related to what 
was mentioned earlier as the intromission of security in the individuals ͞ life processes" (Owens, 2011). 
 Within the context of the US drone policy, concealment is a principle destined to the enemies 
of the US – as in the case of the CIA operating in foreign sole – but it is also intended for domestic 
consumption when the criteria for drone targeting are not transparently discussed in the public realm. 
What we also see with the use of drones overseas is a transformation of both the private and public 
sphere of the countries subject to US drone strikes, where contestation or discussion is absent from 
the public view, and where the principle of safety of  ͞priǀate life͟ is taken as a disposable principle 
even in non-conflict settings. In Pakistan, for instance, the security of four walls is something that has 
virtually ceased to exist, as the number of citizens subject to the fear of drones largely exceeds the 
number of potential terrorists (Allinson, 2015; Stanford and NYU, 2012). As argued by Barrinha and da 
Mota (2016), drones have produced fundamentally uninsurable security subjects in the territories in 
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which they operate: they are subjects perceived as not being entitled to any form of secure or 
securable life. The ultimate consequence is the depoliticisation of those contexts (Bijker, 2006: 693-
694). 
 
 
III. The expiation of Obama: attempting to regain the political  
 
As seen so far, the drone programme under the Obama administration has been surrounded 
by secrecy, covert decisional processes, obsolete congressional oversight and public silence, outdating 
to great extent the political condition of visibility, and eluding a parcel of US public space and freedom. 
This section focuses on how, as its mandate approached to the end, the Obama administration 
became aware of the negative consequences of that political invisibility, and, using Patricia Owens 
words, attempted to re-create a ͞politiĐal island of seĐuritǇ͟ by reconstituting the idea that political 
promises had been kept, thus re-securing a ͞spaĐe for freedoŵ͟ (2011: 28). These notions are offered 
by Hannah Arendt as well, and help reflecting on the possibility for Barack Oďaŵa͛s presidency to 
regain the political in what regards its drone policy. To Owens, ͞seĐuriŶg a space for freedoŵ͟ (2011: 
18) enables a public space of speech and action, in which islands of security can be created by making 
and keeping promises. To sustain this idea, one may illustrate Oďaŵa͛s promises prior to his mandate 
about how he envisioned his administration would conduct counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency. 
Back in 2007, Obama stated:  
I will not hesitate to use military force to take out terrorists who pose a direct threat to 
America. This requires a broader set of capabilities […]. I will ensure that our military 
becomes more stealth, agile, and lethal in its ability to capture or kill terrorists. We need 
to recruit, train, and equip our armed forces to better target terrorists, and to help foreign 
militaries to do the same (Obama, 2007; emphasis added).  
 
In retrospective, it may be considered that the drone programme implemented during Obama's two 
mandates respected scrupulously what he had planned – the lethality in capturing and killing 
terrorists, but also civilians by extension. Accordingly, the number of drone strikes increased very 
significantly under the Obama administration. Although the data officially released in 2016 indicate 
that between 64 and 116 civilians were killed by US drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and 
Libya during the two terms of Oďaŵa͛s presidency, and 2,372 to 2,581 combatants, it is estimated 
that the Obama administration conducted nearly nine times more strikes than his predecessor Bush 
(Devereaux, 2016). However, these numbers remain very far from the most conservative estimations 
presented by investigative journalists and independent researchers, as they contrast with the 
estimations of at least 200 and as many as 1,000 civilians killed by American drone strikes by 
 10 
organisations like the Long War Journal or the Bureau of Investigative Journalism (Devereaux and 
Emmons, 2016). 
In 2006, still as Senator for Illinois, Obama had been publicly critical of the Congress 
overseeing its responsibilities regarding Guantanamo, as he defended the fundamental human rights 
of the detainees as being ͞ďigger than politiĐs͟ (Obama, 2006). Later, as a candidate to presidency, 
Obama referred that the Bush counter-terrorist policy had become ͞aŶ excuse for unchecked 
presidential poǁer͟, and that AŵeriĐa͛s ͞ŵost precious ǀalues͟ had been compromised (Obama, 
2007). In this sense, he promised he would act differently from George W. Bush in terms of political 
visibility, foretelling the need to foster the capabilities of intelligence and law enforcement agencies 
without undermining the Constitution and freedom (ibid.). These political promises help to 
understand how  
Sooner or later, U.S. officials and diplomats toiling to implement what they believed was 
American policy came to realize that there was really only one issue at stake: the domestic 
U.S. political fortunes of the Obama administration. ͞ ͚No bombs on my ǁatĐh,͛ that͛s all 
they wanted to be able to saǇ,͟ explained one former Obama White House official to me. 
͞DroŶes were a cheap, politically painless way of dealing with that. No one even talked 
about it very ŵuĐh͟ (Cockburn, 2015: 3799).   
 
Seemingly, the drone programme might have been painless and uncontroversial within the political 
arena of partisan opposition, but it rapidly became extremely controversial among scholars, 
investigative journalists, and humanitarian organisations. As Arendt says, ͞There always comes the 
point beyond which lying becomes counterproductive͟ (Arendt, 1972: 7). Many reports were 
published throughout Oďaŵa͛s presidency, denouncing the illegality, disproportionality, and overall 
wrong-doings of drone targeting (HRC, 2010; HRW, 2012; O͛CoŶŶell, 2010; Reprieve, 2014; Stanford 
and NYU, 2012; The Intercept, 2015). The US kept defending, throughout Obama's tenure, its drone 
programme, rebuffing the accusations of secrecy and significant death of civilians in Pakistan and 
elsewhere.   
During this period, there were, however, two changes worth mentioning. The first regards 
the significant reduction in CIA͛s drone operations, which saw its activities curtailed in places such as 
Yemen and Syria, with the White House openly preferring the Joint Special Operations Command 
(JSOC) to undertake drone lethal operations whenever possible (Miller, 2016). The second has been 
unfolding since last summer, when the administration released the internal assessment of the drone 
policy in July 2016. This was justified in terms of the ŶatioŶ͛s imperative commitment to comply with 
its obligations under armed conflict, ͞[i]ŶĐludiŶg those that address the protection of civilians, such as 
the fundamental principles of necessity, humanity, distinction, and proportioŶalitǇ͟ (Devereaux, 
2016). Later in October 2016, Obama granted an interview to Jonathan Chait of the New York 
Magazine that is essential to understand his attempt at regaining the political before he went out of 
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office. In it, he acknowledges, among other things, the institutional constraints preventing him from 
discussing more freely issues related to the US drone programme: ͞ We ĐaŶ͛t advertise everything that 
ǁe͛re doing without inhibiting our effectiveness in protecting the American people͟  (Chait and 
Obama, 2016). About his drone policy he argued that although he does not want the US "[t]o get to 
the point where ǁe͛re that comfortable with killing", he thinks people " doŶ͛t always recognize the 
degree to which the civilian-casualty rate, or the rate at which innocents are killed, in these precision 
strikes is significantly lower than what happens in a conventional war" (ibid.). After avowing his 
discomfort with the practice of targeted killing based on a list, Obama basically justifies the civilian 
deaths by minimising their rate in comparison to conventional warfare. Ultimately, there is a 
consequentialist rationale at play that justifies and legitimises everything else. In spite of that, this 
interview displayed Oďaŵa͛s attempt to ͞iŶstitutioŶalize rigorous debate and an attitude of aiming 
before you shoot͟, and his overall concern with ͞ĐoŶstruĐtiŶg greater traŶspareŶĐǇ͟ in an effort to 
institute accountability measures for future presidents to come:   
[I] haǀeŶ͛t lost my preference for good old-fashioned debate, bills, and the democratic 
process. If there͛s one wish that I have for future presidents, it’s not an imperial 
presidency, it is a functional, sensible majority-and-opposition being able to make 
decisions based on facts and policy and compromise. That would have been my 
preference for the majority of my presidency. It was an option that ǁasŶ͛t always available. 
But I hope the American people continue to understand that that͛s how the system should 
work (Chait and Obama, 2016; emphasis added). 
 
This statement contains all the elements essential to the realisation of political action within the public 
realm, as Arendt idealised – debate, democracy, political pluralism, compromise. However, it seems 
this was a promise that was not available for Obama to keep, and that by speaking of it after all the 
political shortcomings were taken, it is a way of re-bonding with the political. To Naureen Shah, 
director of national security and human rights at Amnesty International,  
What͛s so interesting is that President Obama acknowledges this problem — that future 
presidents will be empowered to kill globally, and in secret. What he doesŶ͛t acknowledge 
is how much of a role his administration had in making that a bizarre normal (cit. in 
Devereaux and Emmons, 2016).  
 
Regardless of Obama's personal views on the topic, and late measures in order to curb some of the 
most pernicious effects of his policy, he set the template of how drones can be used in international 
affairs. Obama himself recognises he  
[c]ould see, over the horizon, a situation in which, without Congress showing much 
interest in restraining actions with authorizations that were written really broadly, you 
end up with a president who can carry on perpetual wars all over the world, and a lot of 
them covert, without any accountability or democratic debate (Chait and Obama, 2016; 
emphasis added).  
 
 12 
The minor changes implemented in the last few years of his tenure do not over-trump the fact that 
the new president of the US will be able to continue the same policy without needing to provide any 
significant political justification for it.  
 
 
Conclusion 
This article suggested looking into Oďaŵa͛s drone policy from an Arendtian perspective. By 
doing this, it enhanced the critical connections existing between a contemporary technological device 
of control and killing, material and political visibility, and the very possibility of politics.  
When exploring the conceptual and philosophical possibilities of visibility for technology in 
the first part of the article, it was seen that visibility is fundamental for the public realm to exist, for 
politics to work on behalf of human freedom and agency. Arendt helps understanding that the 
application of technology in society is to conform to that very principle of visibility, meaning that it 
should be thought and debated having public interest as an ultimate goal. Moreover, when 
considering the violence that may derive from technology such as drones, a central concern arises 
with the possibility that gratuitous acts of destruction through technological devices could 
fundamentally depoliticise violence. What this implies for the way security policies are defined is that 
the invisible application of invisible technology denotes the total absence of any political choice, 
understood as a collective transparent action of men to men.   
These utterances were sustained in the second part of the article, when approaching more 
specifically the overall drone policy of the Obama administration. Indeed, it was seen that the violence 
drones entail has not been used as a response to extreme injustice, or as an opener of political space. 
On the contrary, the environment of institutional secrecy in which drones have evolved as a security 
policy indicate an ambiguous interplay of visibility, as they both hide the visibility of politics 
domestically and externally, and expose the lives of civilians, guilty or not, across the globe through 
constant surveillance and threat of lethal action. As a consequence, with drones, it is the privilege of 
a few to know how, and to have access to, their functioning, their effects, and their actual contribution 
to enhance security or freedom.  
Finally, the last section of the article provocatively suggested that Oďaŵa͛s late attempt at 
acknowledging some of the political frailties underlying his drone policy was in fact an attempt at 
͞regaiŶiŶg the political͟. Despite Oďaŵa͛s effort to promote accountability measures and make sure 
presidents after him follow a different practice than his, the reality is he still set a blueprint, whose 
consequences escape his control in the future. Remarkably, looking at another work from Arendt, The 
Origins of Totalitarianism (1976), one cannot dismiss the boomerang effect within history. Racism and 
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the practice of bureaucratically organised violence were initially materialised outside Europe by 
Western imperial powers but would eventually return to the metropolis to haunt them. This is a 
warning from history that one should carefully consider.   
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